Seven Secrets of Istaravshan by Hamrin, Eric
Birds in cages watch over Istaravshan. Stationed on branches, signs, and thatched-mud walls, 
they flutter from perch to perch, eyeing passersby. A street ad displays bright-colored 
specimens backdropped by verdant field and woods, a subtle gray arrow tacked onto the 
frame pointing toward the shop. Istaravshan’s birds are one secret of this city, Tajikistan’s 
fifth most populous but a place poorly known beyond 
Central Asia. With an ancient heritage, and now square 
in the sights of a war against extremism, it deserves 
more attention from outsiders. 
The birds’ keepers are the ten thousand or so families of 
Istaravshan: the teachers, pear vendors, bureaucrats, 
grape cultivators, schoolkids, knifesmiths, labor migrant 
remittance dependents, wood carvers, homemakers, handicraft college enrollees, mineral 
water bottlers, pensioners, police officers, mosque builders, leatherworkers, and shop clerks. 
They can be found thronging the central bazaar, a partly covered multi-block area with 
massive gates overseen by posters: of a Tajik girl in traditional dress, or of her austere 
President amid roses and the proclamation “We are building our Motherland with love!” 
In streets radiating from the bazaar, every dozen meters or so, are children in pairs or groups, 
self-supervised, wearing clothes of Chinese mass-production vintage, with phrases such as 
“Suprer Neakers” or “Coke: Your Music.” Girls consort while boys play football on a dirt-and-
rock field, and representatives of both show off skills with shuttlecocks home-made from black 
plastic shreddings tied to a weight. Pranks and passions appear stenciled on surfaces: 
“HOOLIGAN,” or “Ya !tebya.” Older boys, if they haven’t left for Russia, might hang out at 
the karate-do, while girls preparing for marriage can visit a shop advertised by a slender 
blonde in a Santa hat. 
Beyond the vibrant humanity, though, are signs the city once saw 
better days. The fort-like “Red Flower” hotel, whose balustraded 
rooftop might once have served as a memorable spot for 
conversations over tea, threatens collapse with the slightest shake 
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of earth or strong winter wind off the Ferghana plain. In Central Park, a grimy stone Lenin 
occupies a neglected field of plants, not far from a bronze, ideal Soviet family—father, mother, 
child, and infant—with faces toward the future. A young stone boy gazes at a cracked concrete 
basin, the mouths of his two fishes no longer filling the pool. A rusty Ferris wheel and defunct 
swing ride complete the picture. 
Signs of the Soviet era extend along the main avenue, where 
another Lenin stands flanked by incongruous government 
slogans, and stark male and female figurines exulting in Labor 
are frozen in a wall, obscured by pines. A hammer and sickle 
adorns a doorway, perhaps once leading to some apparatchik’s 
office, but now sporting a cheap plastic ad for a barbershop. 
Below the fading Cyrillic “Telephone–Telegraph” of the post 
office is the English “BEAUTY,” accompanied by two salons. 
Behind the traces of Soviet civilization, however, lies the true glory of Istaravshan. A few steps 
west takes you to the old city, where a medieval visitor would feel at home. The neighborhood 
is a kaleidoscope of curves and sharp corners, among which appear doors and windows 
painted precisely in soft hues of lime and lavender, emerald and peach, sky blue and blood red. 
A thatched-mud corridor turns into a facade painstakingly constructed in rings of polygonal 
tiles around nested cupola-shaped layers set with green, black, yellow, and white square tiles. 
Around the corner, a home shines with three carved stars, each with four points: two long and 
two short. Lining the lower meter of a wall above the road, as though the art is nothing but a 
surface to collect mud splashes, is a long mosaic of seemingly haphazard tiles with dark and 
light hues of blue and red mixed in with black and white, creating a serpentine and violent 
effect. The old city’s decorations are a second secret of Istaravshan. 
The neighborhood’s apex is the Blue Dome (Kök 
Gumbaz), topping a 15th-century mosque and madrassa, 
one of Istaravshan’s handful of exquisite Islamic 
complexes. On an autumn visit in 2014 the gate was 
unlocked and no caretaker was present. Local kids had 
assumed the role, guiding visitors on a spiraling staircase 
to the dome, around which brown and yellow weeds have 
gone airborne and taken root. Leaves blotted the central 
path, thin black lampposts unlit, the small gardens behind them overgrown. Classroom 
windows swung open, and dustless squares on the desks marked where books had lain. In the 
mosque, tools and banners lay strewn about, dust coating the floor’s hexagonal bricks, wall 
paint peeling or chipped away, water stains warping decorative tiles. This most well-known of 
Istaravshan’s landmarks nonetheless is a secret — third on our tour — given its current 
neglect, and relative to the famed Islamic structures of Uzbekistan to the west. 
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Offering escape from the old city’s warren, and carrying us still 
further back in time, is the hill Mugh Teppa, where a fortress gate 
replica faces the hazy, snow-capped mountains that divide Ferghana 
from Tajikistan’s bulk. Behind lies a plateau with detritus from 
construction of unclear purpose, and then, in a lonely windswept 
corner, a true historic artifact: ruined foundations and walls. 
Nothing protects them, no signs speculate as to what they might be. 
No guide or guard administers them. No one is present, other than 
a gang of boys vexing a dog lying in the grass preparing to give birth. 
* * * 
The ruins are Istaravshan’s fourth secret, a spot to pause and sketch how this city has 
traversed history’s margins. Five centuries before the Common Era, as Persia’s Darius I ruled 
much of the Middle East and North Africa, warring with the Greeks in the first of several 
conflicts pivotal to Western history, a city known as Cyropolis (for Cyrus the Great) lay on or 
near modern Istaravshan, in the empire’s northeastern fringe. Two centuries later, Alexander 
“Makedonski” would cross the Oxus/Amu, defeat the Soghdians, and establish Alexandria 
“Eschate” (the Farthest) where Khujand now lies. First though he had to besiege and conquer 
the site we’re now standing on, his soldiers stealing in via a water duct that flowed in the 
vicinity of a modern canal just below Mugh Teppa’s ruins. 
In the ensuing millennia, as dozens of empires contested Asia’s 
heartland, Istaravshan changed hands many times. A Silk Road 
stop, it enjoyed a measure of prosperity, but its fortunes 
periodically waned, particularly when Genghis Khan sacked the 
city in the 13th century. Uzbek clans later fought over Ferghana, a 
conflict that, along with the transcontinental caravan trade’s 
decline, resulted in economic devastation. In the first part of the 
19th century, Istaravshan — now “Uroteppa” — suffered some 50 attacks, lost two-thirds of its 
population, and turned into “one of the most devastated areas of Central Asia.” Control over 
the city shifted back and forth among rulers seated in Bukhara and Kokand.1 
In 1864, amid a surging demand for resources spurred by both industrialization and the 
American Civil War (i.e., cut-off cotton supply), Russia announced its intention to colonize 
Central Asia. Uroteppa was reduced by siege and shells. In 1867 the Bukharan emirate ceded 
it, and other cities, to Russia’s new “General-Governorship of Turkestan.” In the ensuing 
decades, Uroteppa’s citizens often resisted their new overlords, rioting in 1875 and 1907. 
During the Russian and then early Soviet period, unlike most areas of northern Tajikistan, 
Uroteppa and its surrounding district did not become a cotton-monoculture agro-industrial 
area, retaining instead an agriculture based on rainfed cereals, fruits, and vegetables 
(transported throughout the Union), and acquiring some industry, including a textile 
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combine. Soviet education brought opportunities. Uroteppa’s notables — a f i fth secret — 
included several historians, a philosopher and educator, a compiler of folklore, a satirical 
author, a female politician, several physicists and chemists, a seismologist, an economist, a 
poet who had fought the basmachi (rebels against Soviet power), a painter and woodcarver, 
and a ballerina who was one of the first Tajiks in the Russian ballet.2 At the same time though, 
thousands of Uroteppans were forcibly resettled during the 1920s and 1930s as part of a plan 
to develop sparsely populated lands in the Vakhsh valley with migrants from the republic’s 
overpopulated parts. 
With the Soviet Union’s fall, competition over power and resources among Tajikistan’s 
kinship and solidarity networks (including one centered on Uroteppa) sparked civil war. 
Northerners were spared the violence raging in the south, but their alliance with the conflict’s 
eventual victors — the Kulobis — soon soured, as men with guns dominated the government 
at the expense of the traditional northern ruling elite.3 By 1996, northern factions were near 
rebellion against the Kulobi-dominated regime. In May, following the murder of a local 
businessman, thousands took to the streets, including in Uroteppa. The protests lasted more 
than a week and remained peaceful, other than an incident in Uroteppa when police allegedly 
fired into a crowd, killing at least one person and wounding up to five others.4 
Protestors and the government reached an agreement, but President Rahmonov (now 
Rahmon) later allegedly directed the regional police chief to bring demonstration organizers 
to justice. Police searched houses, including those of Ikrom Ashurov (brother of the murdered 
businessman) and his family. Arrested for “banditry,” Ashurov was temporarily held in 
Uroteppa and “constantly beaten,” relatives said. He was transferred to Khujand’s 
overcrowded prison, where in April 1997 inmates rioted. Government personnel, including 
snipers and spetsnaz [special forces], responded with what Human Rights Watch called a 
massacre, citing reports of between 100 and 150 killed (including Ashurov), with 200 
wounded. 
A failed assassination attempt on Rahmonov soon afterward prompted another wave of 
arrests and unexplained killings. In 1998, the brief occupation of Khujand by “renegade” 
colonel Mahmoud Khudoyberdiev proved to be the last spark of rebellion in the north. For 
Uroteppans, and all northerners, the divvying of spoils 
among participants in the 1997 peace accords (i.e., the regime 
and the United Tajik Opposition, without northern-faction 
representatives), along with the more proximate nuisance of 
Kulobi officials deployed as administrators and law enforcers, 
became a reality to be survived rather than reversed. 
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Despite the north’s fall from power, the civil war’s conclusion 
began a sustained economic recovery from which all regions 
benefited. In 2002, Istaravshan (its name restored in 2000) 
celebrated its 2,500th anniversary, reportedly fueled by a 
generous expenditure from presidential brother-in-law Hasan 
Asadulloev’s Oriyon companies.5 Still, a few hold-outs bore the 
flame of resistance. An Istaravshani who served as deputy chair of 
the Taraqqiyot (Development) party, which unsuccessfully sought registration from the 
justice ministry for three years, led a short-lived hunger strike in 2004 and was later arrested by 
the State Committee on National Security (an intelligence and police agency known by the 
acronym GKNB, successor to the Soviet KGB).6 A Democratic Party branch remained 
active in Istaravshan (though the three-year saga of exile, abduction, and sentencing of the 
party’s leader, Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, and a subsequent splitting into factions, sidelined the 
party in Tajik politics). By 2005, discontent crested. According to a local quoted in a 
Wikileaked cable, Istaravshanis were ready to “rise up against” Rahmonov, and regional 
leaders hoped to unseat him in the upcoming election.7 
Mainstream political activity wilted, however, as Rahmonov’s regime cracked down on media, 
NGOs, and political parties in the wake of the 2003-2005 “color revolutions.” By the 2006 
election, which Rahmonov easily won, it was clear that his consolidation of power in the post-
1997 unstable period was not merely a temporary measure in the 
national interest but a long-term, enduring agenda. In 
Istaravshan and elsewhere, any remaining expressions of 
discontent went underground. Around the same time, signs 
emerged of an Islamic revival in Tajikistan, particularly in the 
north. These two developments may have sowed the seeds for 
the conflict that lay ahead. 
One Wikileaked cable, from 2009, describes an Istaravshan mosque whose Friday 
worshippers exceeded the space’s capacity for 4,000 and flowed into the street. Government 
restrictions on Islam, encoded in legislation or practiced informally by police, grated on 
residents. Imams declared that strict enforcement of government dictates would provoke 
resistance.8 The government eventually removed recalcitrant imams from their mosques, 
while other Islamic leaders fell afoul of the law.9 When the government required mosques to 
re-register, a third of Istaravshan’s had their applications returned due to “errors.”10 In July 
2010, law enforcement raided unregistered madrassas in Sughd (Tajikistan’s northern oblast), 
including in Istaravshan, arresting mullahs in the process.11 
* * * 
The fuel was dry and thick, conflagration only a spark away. In late summer of 2010 it arrived. 
Tajikistan observers remember 23 August, whose fifth anniversary is approaching, as the day a 
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few dozen prisoners escaped from a GKNB detention facility, prompting a man hunt and a 
major security operation in the Rasht Valley. In Sughd, however, the key date is 3 September, 
when a car exploded in the courtyard of the police ministry’s regional counter–organized crime 
department (RUBOP), killing three and injuring several dozen. The resulting anti-terrorism 
wave of arrests and trials continues to this day and has received far less international attention 
than the Rasht “mini-war.” Istaravshan’s role in the saga is its sixth secret. 
In the months after the bombing, dozens (mostly young men in their twenties) were arrested, 
including relatives of Akmal Karimov, an Istaravshani. Authorities had used blood-type 
analysis to establish that Karimov was the car’s driver—and thus Tajikistan’s first suicide 
bomber. His father challenged the claim, noting that many 
human remains were present at the scene. He demanded a 
DNA test, to no avail. The government lumped 53 detainees’ 
cases into a single trial. As the men were mostly from 
Istaravshan city or district, they became known as the 
“Istaravshan 53.” Violations of criminal procedure and human 
rights during the nine-month investigation, documented by 
civil society, indicate the brutal fury with which Tajikistan’s 
security apparatus sallied into its northern war on terror.12 
The 53 were held incommunicado for days, weeks, or months, while their families sought 
information and their lawyers struggled to gain access. Many detainees, reportedly under 
duress, waived their right to legal representation. Others saw their lawyers only infrequently 
(and always in the presence of state representatives) or, in some cases, only once the trial 
began. Court-assigned lawyers were of dubious value; some, for example, asked that clients 
sign documents without reading them. Police and GKNB officers pressured detainees to sign 
confessions that would serve as the primary evidence in court. 
“Duress” and “pressure” took the form of physical and 
psychological torture, allegations of which appeared in 
complaints lodged by all but four of the 53. As though security 
personnel were experimenting to improve their repertoire, the 
methods described run the gamut of horrors that humans inflict 
on one another. A selection: 
• removal of fingernails and beards
• beatings of hands, feet, heels, and kidneys
• application of electric shock13
• rape
• outdoor cold-water dousings during winter
• burning with cigarettes
• threats to rape or otherwise harm spouses and relatives
• forced viewing of the torture or humiliation of others
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The trial was classed “secret” and held behind closed doors. Neither the judge nor the 
prosecutor’s office gave credence to the complaints of torture, concluding they were 
“unconfirmed.”14 Without warning, on December 23, 2011, the judge read the verdict and 
began the sentencing. Lawyers who learned of the proceeding were denied entry to the 
courthouse. Ten defendants were convicted in connection with the September 2010 bombing, 
the rest of membership in the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or other illegal organizations. 
Five received life sentences, the others eight to 30 years each.15 
The “Istaravshan 53” case was the largest trial in the bombing’s 
wake, and the most well documented, but only one of several 
dozen conducted in Sughd in the last five years. This past 
January, an official revealed that 270 alleged extremists had 
been arrested in Sughd since the bombing.16 In most cases, little 
is publicly known about the defendants — the trials are closed-
door, locals are afraid to talk, and media, civil society, and 
lawyers are wary to get involved. International attention on 
Tajikistan focuses on the Afghanistan border and the drug 
trade.  
Istaravshan, a bullseye for the crackdown, languishes in obscurity. Imagine if scores of anti-
extremism arrests occurred in the fifth-largest urban areas of various Western countries: the 
Bay Area, Nice, Bristol, or Frankfurt. The clamor for more information — and transparent 
justice — would deafen. In Tajikistan, by contrast, most arrests garner cursory mentions in the 
press (which must tread cautiously when pursuing truth outside official sources), with group 
sizes or personal initials often in lieu of names. Fuller stories sometimes survive in civil 
society’s brave reports, but these gain little notice overseas.17 
This past year, as concern grew over the recruitment of Central Asians for the war in Syria, 
particularly with the Islamic State’s emergence, the anti-extremism campaign in Sughd 
escalated. In January, RUBOP arrested six Istaravshani alleged members of Jamaat 
Ansarullah (JA), a Tajik terrorist group.18 A lawyer claimed RUBOP questioned the men 
without counsel present and forced them to confess. One man reportedly had in fact tried to 
travel to Syria, but his father persuaded him to return 
home. Two defendants claimed they merely collected 
donations to help families of men imprisoned as 
extremists. In April the six got prison terms of nearly a 
decade each, while a seventh received a year for knowing 
of the group’s crimes but not telling authorities. 
From late September — when a UN Security Council 
resolution addressed the foreign terrorist fighter trend — till the end of 2014, Sughd law 
enforcement detained nearly 50 people for belonging to terrorist organizations and/or for “the 
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desire to participate” in the Syrian war.19 In November, RUBOP arrested twelve men, 
including an Istaravshani “emir,” on charges of involvement in JA and recruiting for the Syria 
conflict. (A thirteenth was arrested in Kyrgyzstan and transferred to Tajik custody.) This 
February, the group received sentences of 9 to 12 years each. The campaign maintained its 
momentum into 2015. Just this month, 23 alleged JA members, including some Istaravshanis, 
received long prison terms.20 
* * * 
Tajikistan’s security apparatus has racked up a superficially impressive record in its post-
September 2010 war on terror. But is it uprooting a genuine threat, or merely lashing out at 
phantoms? How many of the hundreds now imprisoned had any 
connection with the car bomb, or with any plots (of which none 
have resulted in attacks) since? How many are instead paying for 
the crime of non-sanctioned religious belief? Or for being unable 
to afford a bribe when some security official needed to show 
results or fill a quota? 
Apart from the haze surrounding 
the crackdown, the issue of 
radicalization remains. If it is 
occurring, to what extent is it the 
offspring of years of government 
repression?21 In Istaravshan, 
where Islamic revival clashed with 
government repression early on, 
symbols of the conflict appear in 
the old city. The Blue Dome’s 
state of neglect—the scattered 
leaves, missing books, the dust—
stems from a July 2013 government 
directive “temporarily” suspending 
the madrassa’s operation, pending 
an education ministry permit.22 
Nearby, on the same dirt-and-rock 
field where boys play football, 
derelict iron hulks intended as 
skeletal support for domes lie 
beneath a large brick building. 
The kids explain this was to be a 
madrassa, but officials stopped the 
project. 
Dome frames near an unfinished madrassa credit: author 
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Most poignant, however, is another object that watches over Istaravshan. Adorning 
government buildings—police headquarters, the fire hall, the GKNB, neighborhood cop 
stations—are posters displaying a checkerboard of snapshots of nearly 100 wanted terrorists 
and extremists. Most are young men, their images captured in black and white, or in fuzzy 
color, nearly every face serious and smooth-shaven, often above a collared shirt and tie, the 
pictures evidently taken before their subjects transformed into bearded, anti-social radicals. 
Below each is biographical data in print too fine to be read by casual passersby. The poster’s 
implicit message is clear, though: Enemies surround you — but we know who they are. 
The wanted posters are an ominous seventh secret of Istaravshan, a shadow colliding with 
the brightness of the birds peering into the same corridors where such supposed danger lurks. 
* * * 
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